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I. Introduction
Since September 11, 2001, people have broached the subject
of torture with increasing regularity as the United States and its
t I would like to thank the editorial staff and board of the North Carolina Journal
of Inernational Law and Commericial Regulation vol. 32 for all their hard work. I would
also like to thank my wife, Nina, for putting (up with) me through law school.
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allies prosecute the war on terror around the globe. A long history
of legal opinions and thought attends the subject of torture, but the
issue has particular relevance in the context of the ongoing global
war on terror. The goal of this war is to root out suspected
terrorists before they strike. Naturally, such an initiative relies
upon collaboration by the intelligence and security services of
many nations. Because of the international scope of anti-terrorism
efforts, it is not enough to deal with torture in the modus operandi
of domestic police, intelligence, or military forces. At present, a
suspect detained and interrogated in Southeast Asia may stand trial
in the United Kingdom, and someone arrested by intelligence
agents in the Middle East may face justice in the United States of
America. Governments must concern themselves not just with
their own agents, but also with the practices of those in other
nations involved in the capture, incarceration, and interrogation of
suspected terrorists.
In December of 2005, the British House of Lords held that
evidence obtained by torture is inadmissible regardless of who
performed the torturous act.' A and others v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department (A and others 11)2 was an appeal from the
decision of a special commission charged with removal
proceedings under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act of
2001 (ATCSA)3 This piece of legislation was a British response
to the attacks of September 11, 2001.4 Like the Patriot Act in the
United States,5 the ATCSA was designed to give greater
protection to the public against international terrorism. 6 Also like
the Patriot Act, the ATCSA has generated controversy regarding
certain of its provisions. One of the gravest concerns surrounding
the ATCSA is the extensive power granted to intelligence and
I A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others I1) [2005]
UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. 1249 (U.K.).
2 Id.
3 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (U.K.), [hereinafter
ATCSA].
4 A and others ll, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1256.
5 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
6 See ATCSA, 2001, c. 24 (U.K.).
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security officials to detain and interrogate suspects.7
This note will compare the approach taken by the House of
Lords with the prevailing legal trends regarding torture in the
United States. Particular attention will be given to the effect of
applying the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by torture and
the role of courts in enforcing a ban on torture techniques. This
note posits that the contrasting approaches of the United States and
Britain reveal a strange irony. Typically in the United States,
violations of a suspect's constitutional rights by investigators can
lead to the exclusion of the evidence obtained. But the American
approach to using evidence obtained by torture seems to avoid the
strictures normally imposed by the Constitution-specifically the
exclusionary rule for evidence triggered by the Fourth Amendment
as well as the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which might also lead to the exclusion of such
evidence as unconstitutionally obtained. By avoiding the normal
sanctions of the criminal justice system, the American approach
does not risk losing evidence obtained by torture to exclusion. In
contrast, the British, who have no per se exclusionary rule for
evidence, have adhered to a relatively more stringent standard for
excluding torture-tainted evidence. This note will explore this
seemingly counterintuitive result to the use of torture-obtained
evidence.
The importance of this inquiry is highlighted by recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions to allow federal courts to hear at least
some habeas corpus petitions by detainees who, up to that point,
were interrogated extraterritorially in completely extra-judicial
proceedings.8 The U.S. courts have yet to decide the issue that
was presented to the House of Lords in A and others H. Now that
some detainees may have their day in court, the United States'
policy on evidence obtained by torture deserves more scrutiny.
The comparison with the British approach to torture-induced
evidence may be instructive in predicting how American courts
will react. The current approach of the American government,
however, seems to indicate a willingness to subvert longstanding
7 See id. § 23.
8 See, e.g. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). But see discussion of Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and Military Commissions Act of 2006 (greatly limiting detainee
access to federal courts), infra section III(D)(2).
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principles of law in order to serve what are admittedly very
pressing expediencies of national security in the war on terror.
The paper will begin with an examination of the holding of
the principal case, A and others II, in Part II. Part III will set forth
some relevant background law on torture, first in the United
Kingdom and then the United States. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
current approaches to torture in the United States and Britain. Part
V is a conclusion.
II. The Holding
The central holding of A and others II was announced by Lord
Bingham of Cornhill. Though each of the seven Law Lords sitting
on the panel wrote separately in the case, all agreed that evidence
obtained through torture by officials of a foreign state without the
complicity of British authorities must be excluded from use at
trial.9  In Britain, torture is illegal, but evidence obtained
unlawfully by British officials is not excluded unless it can be
proven that admission would make the trial unfair."0 Broadly
speaking, the British system does not rely on an exclusionary rule
for illegally obtained evidence. However, the Law Lords still
found that the use of evidence tainted by torture was per se
inadmissible." The Law Lords' decision was based on English
common law, the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 as
well as various components of public international law. 13 The Law
Lords split as to the proper burden of proof for evidence alleged to
9 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others I1) [2005]
UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. 1249, 1250 (U.K.).
10 Julian Samiloff, Interrogating Evidence, 156 NEW L.J. 5, 5 (2006). The British
standard is somewhat comparable to the "fundamental fairness" due process standard in
American law. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-72 (1953) (stating that
the Due Process clause exists in order to preserve the fairness and integrity of the
system). The defendant would have to demonstrate actual prejudice from the
introduction of the evidence, as opposed to a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
where evidence obtained illegally might be per se inadmissible. See generally Samiloff,
Interrogating Evidence, 156 NEw L.J. 5. (2006) (regarding the British standard for the
exclusion of evidence).
I A and others 11, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1250.
12 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
13 A and others 11 [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1267 et. seq.
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be obtained by torture, with a majority holding to a less-exacting
"balance of the probabilities" standard rather than the "real risk"
standard advocated by Lord Bingham. 4
The case involved ten foreign nationals who had been residing
in Britain.15 Each of the appellants had been "certified" by the
Secretary of State for the Home Department as threats to national
security under the ATCSA, meaning they were subject to removal
from the country. 16 The appellants challenged their certification
under the ATCSA."7 The ATCSA indicates that such appeals for
certifications are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SIAC). 18  Appeals from SIAC determinations are
taken by the British courts of appeal, and the House of Lords in
turn took this appeal from a lower appeals court's rejection of the
petitioners' case.19 Among the issues the appellants raised before
SIAC was the admissibility of certain evidence used against
them.20  They challenged the evidence because they believed it
was obtained from sources outside the U.K. through the use of
torture by foreign intelligence or security forces.21 SIAC upheld
the use of such evidence and this became the primary issue on
appeal to the House of Lords.22
The Secretary of State argued that evidence should be
excluded only where British agents were complicit in committing
torture.23 The Secretary's argument was founded on the idea that
reliance on evidence that "has or may have been obtained by
14 A and others I1, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1301-02 (L. Hope of Craighead, concurring
in the judgment). Lord Bingham does not clearly state what it would take to meet the
"real risk" burden. Id. at 1285.
15 Id. at 1258.
16 See ATCSA, supra note 3, § 21 (detainees would be placed in deportation
proceedings).
17 A and others 11, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1255.
18 ATCSA supra note 3, § 25.
19 For the appeals court decision, see A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't., [2004] EWCA Civ 1123, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 414 (U.K.).
20 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others 11) [2005]
UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1255 (U.K.).
21 See id. at 1255-56.
22 See id. at 1258.
23 Id. at 1281.
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torture inflicted in a foreign country without British complicity" is
necessary for the efficient functioning of security and intelligence
services.24 These services often rely, according to the Secretary,
upon information gathered by foreign agents in nations with a less
progressive stance on the use of torture. Without the ability to
rely on those services, an important stream of information would
run dry.26
While offering some deference to the vital importance of the
national security interests asserted by the Secretary of State for the
Home Department, Lord Bingham clearly stated that the
admission of evidence obtained by torture went against the
overwhelming weight of the British common law tradition and
would not constitute merely an evidentiary problem, but an abuse
of process.27 As he put it: "The principles of common law,
standing alone, in my opinion compel the exclusion of third party
torture evidence as unreliable, unfair, offensive to ordinary
standards of humanity and decency[,] and incompatible with the
principles which should animate a tribunal seeking to administer
justice., 28 In addition, Lord Bingham found ample evidence in the
European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations
Torture Convention to support his position.29
On the issue of whether evidence obtained by. torture is
admissible, Lord Bingham spoke for the majority of the panel.3 °
On the question of the burden of proof, however, the Lords
differed.3 Lords Bingham, Nicholls of Birkenhead, and Hoffman,
would all have held SIAC to a "real risk" standard.3 2 This would
mean that unless SIAC is able to determine that there is no "real
risk" the evidence has been obtained by torture, the evidence is
inadmissible.33 Lord Bingham did not make clear the exact burden
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 A and others 11, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1281.
27 Id. at 1259.
28 Id. at 1283.
29 Id. at 1284.
30 Id. at 1286.
31 Id.
32 See A and others 11, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1285.
33 Id. at 1285.
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of proof for proving a "real risk," stating that it "[a]ll will depend
on the facts and circumstances of a particular case."34
A majority, composed of Lords Hope of Craighead, Rodger of
Earlsferry, Carswell, and Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, ruled
in favor of a different standard.35 They found, according to Lord
Hope, that the SIAC should exclude evidence only if it finds "on a
balance of probabilities that it was obtained by torture. 3 6 This
balance of probabilities standard is less exacting, meaning that if
"[the] SIAC is left in doubt as to whether the evidence was
obtained in this way [using torture], it should admit it."37  The
balance of probabilities standard is essentially a preponderance of
the evidence burden; the occurrence of torture should be more
likely than not in order to exclude the evidence obtained.
III.Background Law
A. International Agreements
1. The U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The United Nations created the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR) in 1966, and the treaty
entered into force in 1976. 38 The ICCPR was created as one of
two supplements to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.39
Article 7 of the ICCPR reads as follows: "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman[,] or degrading treatment
or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation."4  The
ICCPR serves, in Lord Bingham's opinion, as evidence of the
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1296-1319.
36 A and others If. [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1301-02 (L. Hope of Craighead, concurring
in the judgment).
37 Id.
38 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter the ICCPR]. Both the
United States and the United Kingdom are signatories. Id.
39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 79, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., lstplen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
40 The ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 7.
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established nature of the prohibition on torture in international
law.4 The ICCPR is regarded as taking a strong normative stance
against torture, but has little in the way of enforcement
possibilities.42
2. The U.N. Convention against Torture
The text of the United Nations Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the
UN Convention) is fairly straightforward in regard to evidence
obtained by torture. Article 15 of the UN Convention states
simply that "[e]ach State Party shall ensure that any statement
which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall
not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a
person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was
made., 43 Thus, the Convention not only establishes a prohibition
on torture, but also explicitly mandates an exclusionary rule for
evidence obtained by torture.44 Both the U.K. and United States
are signatories, but the U.S. signed with certain reservations that
limit the enforceability of the UN Convention.45
3. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights (the European
Convention) was established in 1950 under the auspices of the
Council of Europe.46  The European Convention guarantees
substantive rights as well as the possibility of legal redress for the
violation of those rights in the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg. 47 Article 3 of the European Convention prohibits the
subjection of any person to torture.48 There is no listed exception
41 A and others II, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1270.
42 Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1696 (2005).
43 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. 15, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
44 Id.
45 S. ExEc. REP. no. 101-30, at 36 (1990) (articulating the U.S. reservations to the
instrument).
46 European Convention, supra note 12.
47 Id. art. 32.
48 Id. art. 3.
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to this provision of the European Convention. The provisions of
the European Convention have been expressly incorporated into
British law by the Human Rights Act 1998 Chapter 42."
B. UK Sources of Law
1. Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act of 1997
(SIAC)
SIAC was established by statute in 19970 as "a superior court
of record" whose purpose was "to reconcile the competing
demands of procedural fairness and national security in the case of
foreign nationals whom it was proposed to deport on the grounds
of their danger to the public."'" The Lord Chancellor" appoints
the members of SIAC; also, under sections 5 and 8 of the SIAC
Act, he can promulgate rules of procedure for SIAC, subject to
parliamentary approval. 53  The rules may include proceedings in
which the appellant is not given the details of the decision, and
even for proceedings to take place in the appellant's absence.54 In
the latter case, a "special advocate" is to be appointed by the
presiding officer to report a summary of the proceedings to the
appellant.55
49 Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42, art. 1 (U.K.).
50 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, c. 68, (Eng.) [hereinafter
SIAC Act].
51 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others II) [2005]
UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1255, 1257 (U.K.).
52 The Lord Chancellor is a cabinet level appointment (actually called the Secretary
of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor) in Britain whose current
responsibilities include: "the resourcing of his Departments; major constitutional issues;
appointments, including all judicial appointments; Royal, Church and Hereditary issues,
and Lord Lieutenants; making or approving rules of court; Privy Counsellors (other than
Cabinet Ministers) who have addressed their query to the Secretary of State personally.
Where a Privy Counsellor writes to another Minister by name that Minister may respond
personally; correspondence with Cabinet Ministers, and the higher Judiciary."
Department for Constitutional Affairs, http://www.dca.gov.uk/dept/depconmin.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2006).
53 SIAC Act, supra note 50, §§ 5-8.
54 Id. § 5.
55 Id. § 5.
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2. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001
(ATSCA)
The ATSCA was originally passed in the wake of September
11, 2001 to increase the government's power to protect against
terrorist threats.56 One provision of the ATSCA allowed the
Secretary of State for the Home Department to "certify" foreign
nationals considered to be a threat to national security (those with
ties to international terrorism).57 Under the original terms of the
2001 act, this "certification" essentially provided the government
with the ability to detain the suspect indefinitely, without criminal
charges.58 The process afforded under the ATSCA was an appeal
heard by SIAC.59  Because of the potential sensitivity of the
matters involved, SIAC could invoke their rulemaking power to
exclude the appellant or keep certain evidence secret. 6' This
meant that a suspect could be detained indefinitely, with no formal
charges and no knowledge of the evidence being used against
him.6'
3. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
In 2005, after a House of Lords decision in an earlier stage of
the present litigation held that the ATSCA was incompatible with
Britain's obligations under the European Convention on Human
Rights,62 section 4 of the ATSCA was replaced by the Prevention
of Terrorism Act.63 The 2005 version replaced the indefinite
detention provision with "control orders," which allow the Home
Department Secretary to impose extensive conditions on the
movements of the suspected person with restrictions approaching a
56 See generally ATCSA, supra note 3 (establishing procedures for confronting the
threat of terrorism).
57 Id. § 21.
58 Id. § 23.
59 Id. § 25.
60 Id. § 27.
61 See id.
62 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others 1) [2004]
UKHL 56, [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 (U.K.).
63 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 (U.K.).
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form of house arrest.64
C. British Common Law
The Court detailed an array of British common law sources
inweighing against the use of torture, which as one source stated,
"always had been illegal by the common law. 65  According to
another source, "the crimes of murder and robbery are not more
distinctly forbidden by our criminal code than the application of
the torture to witnesses of accused persons is condemned by the
oracles of the Common law. 66  After listing these historical
sources of support, Lord Bingham cite case law supporting the
prohibition of torture-induced evidence.67
One of the more important precedents is the House of Lords
decision from an earlier stage of the current litigation: A and
others J.68 This case arose from challenges to Section 23 of the
original ATSCA.6 9 On December 16, 2004, the Law Lords ruled
that the powers of detention granted by section 23 of the ATSCA
were contradictory to the United Kingdom's obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights."° An 8-1 majority held
that the derogation from the Convention written into the ATSCA
conflicted with articles 5 and 14 of the European Convention. 1
As a result, the Court quashed the derogation from the European
Convention and issued the following declaration:
[U]nder section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998... section 23
of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is
incompatible with articles 5 and 14 of the European Convention
insofar as it is disproportionate and permits detention of
64 Id. § 1.
65 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others 11) [2005]
UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1255, 1260 (U.K.) (quoting SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 5
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194-95 (1945)).
66 Id., (quoting D. JARDINE, A READING ON THE USE OF TORTURE IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND PREVIOUSLY TO THE COMMONWEALTH 13, (1837)).
67 Id. at 1261-68.
68 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others 1) [2004]
UKHL 56, [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 (UK).
69 Id. at 88.
70 Id.
71 Id. (the nine judge panel was unprecedented for the House of Lords).
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suspected international terrorists in a way that discriminates on
the ground of nationality or immigration status.
72
In other words, the Court found the ATSCA wanting in two
important respects: it was not proportionally tailored to the threat
and it discriminated unjustifiably based on nationality.
The Court in A and others II also cited precedent for their
holding that evidence obtained by torture is inadmissible,
regardless of whether or not the evidence later proves to be
reliable. Lord Bingham cited a case in which a different court
held:
the more recent English cases established that the rejection of an
improperly obtained confession is not dependent only upon
possible unreliability but also upon the principle that a man
cannot be compelled to incriminate himself and upon the
importance that attaches in a civilised society to proper
behaviour by the police towards those in their custody.73
The Court cited a series of cases in which the actions of British
authorities had resulted in questions of due process.74 The Court
also looked at cases dealing with the possibility of unfairness that
would result from the failure of a foreign government to adhere to
principles of due process after extradition from Britain.75 Finally,
the Court cited the British trial of Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet, in which it was established that the jus cogens nature of
the international crime of torture justifies states in taking universal
jurisdiction over torture wherever committed.76
72 Id. at 130.
73 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others 11) [2005]
UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1255, 1262 (U.K.) (quoting Lam Chi-ming v. The Queen
[1991] 2 A.C. 212, 220 (U.K.)).
74 Id. at 1263-64 (citing R v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett,
[1994] 1 A.C. 42; R v. Latif [1996] 1 W.L.R. 104: R v. Mullen, [2000] Q.B. 520; R v.
Looseley, Att'y General's Reference (No. 2 of 2000) [2001] UKHL 53).
75 Id. at 1266 (citing R (Ramda) v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't. [2002] EWHC
1278 (Admin.).
76 Id. at 1272; see R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
(No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 198 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Q.B. Div' Ct.) (U.K.).
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D. American Sources
1. Case Law
In justifying the use of the exclusionary rule in A and others II,
Lord Bingham cited Justice Felix Frankfurter, who wrote for the
Supreme Court of the United States in Rochin v. California that
due process may be violated by "conduct that shocks the
conscience" even though the evidence obtained through that
conduct is accurate and relevant to a conviction.77 Rochin is a
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment case, but it is also more
generally a case at the heart of the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence dealing with torture and cruel, degrading, or
inhuman treatment. 78 The case involved a suspect who swallowed
illegal drugs.79 In order to recover them, the police forced a tube
down his throat and pumped his stomach.80 The Court held that
this violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8' As Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause
'inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment
upon the whole course of the proceedings (resulting in a
conviction) in order to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged
with the most heinous offenses.'
82
Rochin proscribes brutality as a tactic by American law
enforcement officers, not because evidence extracted by such
measures is unreliable, but because the measures are themselves
offensive to the justice system.83
An earlier Supreme Court case, Brown v. Mississippi,
77 Id. at 1262 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), "we are
compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do
more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.").
78 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 167.
79 Id. at 166.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 168, 174.
82 Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S 401,416-17 (1945)).
83 See id. at 173-74.
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established that the Due Process Clause protections of the federal
84Constitution are incorporated and apply to the states. In that
case, Mississippi police officers had tortured confessions out of
black suspects who were convicted using no other evidence than
their confessions." Chief Justice Hughes wrote that "[i]t would be
difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of
justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these
petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the
basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due
process.86
The Supreme Court has expressed concern not only for illegal
tactics of obtaining evidence, but also for unfair methods of
getting such evidence admitted at trial. Two cases from the mid-
20th Century dealt with what came to be known as the "silver
platter" doctrine.87  The "silver platter" is used to describe a
questionable law enforcement technique in which officials would
"serve up" evidence illegally obtained under the rules of state
jurisdictions and hand it over to officials in federal jurisdiction, or
vice versa, so it could be used against a defendant.88 The Court
invalidated this practice through two different cases. In one case,
the Court disallowed States from using material that federal agents
seized unconstitutionally.89 In another case, the Court held against
the use in federal courts of material that State agents had seized
unconstitutionally. 90
In the 1980 case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit addressed the issue of American
jurisdiction over foreign torturers who were present in the United
States.91 In Filartiga, the plaintiff brought suit under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) against a Paraguayan citizen, who was in New
York at the time, for torture committed in Paraguay under the
84 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
85 Id. at 287.
86 Id. at 286.
87 RONALD JAY ALLEN, JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEBRA A. LIVINGSTON, & WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 339 (2005).
88 Id.
89 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
90 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
91 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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dictatorial regime of Alfredo Stroessner.92 The ATS was passed in
1789 but lay essentially dormant until 1980, when it began to be
used as a way for victims seeking restitution to bring foreign
torturers into federal court in the United States.93 In allowing the
suit to go forward the Second Circuit held that "the torturer has
become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding today.., is a
small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to
free all people from brutal violence.,
94
In another case, the Second Circuit found that due process
requires "a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the
government's deliberate, unnecessary[,] and unreasonable
invasion of the accused's constitutional rights." 95 However, in that
same case the Court noted that constitutional protection, "applies
only to the conduct abroad of agents acting on behalf of the United
States" and not to acts of foreign governments or individuals
acting without American complicity. 96
In 1990, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), 9" that certain constitutional
protections extended only to citizens and those with sufficient ties
to our "national community" to be considered part of "the
people." 98 Specifically, this was the case for the First, Second,
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, whose language specified
protection for 'the people' and not, for example 'the accused,' as
in the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.99 This contrast suggests that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments might have broader applicability,
but the Court also held that the Fifth Amendment is not applicable
92 Id. at 877-79.
93 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 (2005) [hereinafter ATS] ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
94 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
95 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
96 Id. at 280 n.9.
97 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 266.
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to aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States.' 0
Justice Brennan wrote a vigorous dissent in the case, arguing that
the rule of law should be applied to anyone who is subject to our
laws, regardless of their citizenship, residence, or ties to the
country.'0 ' He warned that "as our Nation becomes increasingly
concerned about the domestic effects of international crime, we
cannot forget that the behavior of our law enforcement agents
abroad sends a powerful message about the rule of law to
individuals everywhere."10 2
In a case related to Verdugo-Urquidez, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 693 (2004), the Court held that the abduction
and detention of a Mexican doctor suspected of involvement in the
murder at issue in Verdugo-Urquidez was not a violation of
international law and so could not be the basis for a claim under
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 10 3 The ATS has an exception to the
waiver of immunity for government liability for foreign
countries,'04 which the Court found applied in this case.0 5 Under
the supervision of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the
suspect was arrested in Mexico by foreign agents, transported to
the United States, and taken into custody by American law
enforcement agents. 10 6 The Court rejected the idea that American
agents were the proximate cause of Alvarez's abduction and
refused to apply -the "headquarters doctrine," which the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held would get around the foreign
country exception.'0 7 Ultimately, the Court held that Alvarez's
claim was simply not substantial enough to constitute a breach of
international law.'08 His single complaint was an illegal detention
lasting only the day he was abducted in Mexico (once he was in
100 Id. at 269; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950) ("the
nonresident enemy alien... does not have even.., qualified access to our courts.").
101 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
102 Id. at 285.
103 Sosa v. Avarez, 542 U.S. 693, 692-94 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 (2005)).
104 28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(k) (2005).
105 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694.
106 Id. at 702.
107 Id. at 702-12.
108 Id. at 736.
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the U.S. his treatment was held to be lawful).' 9 The Court held
that this complaint lacked any substantial support in international
law, including the ICCPR." 0 The Court's holding, while clearly
denying liability in this case, does seem to imply that a well-
established violation of a norm of international law might indeed
serve as the basis for a valid claim under the ATS."'
2. U.S. Anti-Torture Statutes
The United States has enacted legislation that makes it a crime
punishable by up to twenty years in prison for a person subject to
U.S. jurisdiction to commit an act of torture outside the United
States.1 12 If a person dies as a result of the act of torture, then the
offense is punishable by death." 3 The statute includes a definition
of torture as "an act committed by a person acting under the color
of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental
pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful
sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical
control.""'14
Recently, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) attached an
amendment to the Department of Defense appropriations bill in
order to clarify and strengthen the American torture statute." 5 The
McCain Amendment added the language of a prohibition on
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" to the prohibition on
torture found in the torture statute." 6  McCain supported his
amendment by insisting that it was merely making official what
109 Id. at 698.
110 Id. at 735.
111 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-34.
112 See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 A(a) (2000) (presumably ordinary provisions of criminal
and constitutional law prohibit torture within the United States).
113 Id. § 2340 A(a)(c).
114 Id. § 2340(1).
115 Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3475 (2006) (McCain
Amendment codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2005)). For an explanation of the
McCain Amendment process, see, e.g., Michael Garcia, Interrogation of Detainees:
Overview of the McCain Amendment, CRS Report for Congress, 1-2 (Jan. 24, 2006),
available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RS22312.pdf#search=%22mccain%20
amendment%20to%20the%20torture%20statute%22 (explaining the McCain
Amendment).
116 See 42 U.S.C. §2000dd (2005).
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were already established norms. As the Senator put it, "if that
doesn't sound new, that's because it's not-the prohibition has been
a longstanding principle in both law and policy in the United
States.""' 7 McCain's goals were to send a signal to the world that
the United States does not torture, to protect U.S. soldiers abroad
by giving the soldiers clear guidelines, and to discourage their
torture at the hands of foreign captors.1 18  But McCain's
amendment did not include any enforcement provision, so it
served only as a normative or policy statement. Also, in the very
same appropriations bill that carried the McCain Amendment,
Congress passed the Graham-Levin Amendment.119  This
Amendment allowed the use of evidence obtained by "coercion"
by the Department of Defense for detainees in Guantdnamo Bay
and restricted detainee access to federal courts.120
In October of 2006 Congress passed a new bill titled the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which deals with-
among other things-the use of torture-obtained evidence by U.S.
military tribunals. 12' The MCA was the result of a compromise
between the President and Congress, in which the White House
sought to create a bill that would grant fewer detainee rights and
grant greater executive discretion in detainee treatment, and
several members of Congress fought to include provisions
strengthening the prohibitions on torture and reinforcing the due
process afforded detainees.122
117 See Sen. John McCain, Statement of Senator John McCain on Detainee
Amendments on (1) The Army Field Manual and (2) Cruel, Inhumane, Degrading
Treatment (Nov. 4, 2005), http://mccain.senate.gov (go to "press office," select "press
releases" select "2005," select "November," and select the link to the press release).
118 See id.
119 Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-163 119 Stat. 3475 (2006) (codified as
amended sections in 10 U.S.C.S. § 801 (2005)).
120 Id. at 3476, 3479.
121 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 (2006)
122 For a description of the compromise that holds the bill was not a middle ground
but a capitulation to the President by Congress, see Michael Doff, Why the Military
Commissions Act is no Moderate Compromise, FindLaw's Writ, Oct. 11, 2006,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20061011.html ("prior to reaching an agreement with
the President, four prominent Republican Senators-Susan Collins, Lindsey Graham,
John McCain, and John Warner-had drawn a line in the sand, refusing to go along with
a measure that would have redefined the Geneva Conventions' references to 'outrages
upon personal dignity' and 'humiliating and degrading treatment.'... ).
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Under the MCA, statements obtained before enactment of the
Detainee Treatment Act (before Dec. 30, 2005) "in which the
degree of coercion is disputed may be admitted only if the military
judge finds that (1) the totality of the circumstances renders the
statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value; and
the interests of justice would be served by admission into
evidence." 123 Statements obtained on or after December 30, 2005
may be admitted if: the totality of the circumstances renders the
statement reliable; the interest of justice would be served by
admission, and the interrogation methods used to obtain the
statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
prohibited by the Detainee Treatment Act. 124 In other words, there
is a prohibition on using torture-obtained evidence, but it can be
overcome by a sufficient showing of reliability for evidence
obtained before December 30, 2005.
The MCA's restrictions on torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment are tempered by some of the Act's other
provisions. Most important, perhaps, is the way the MCA
redefines torture in amending the War Crimes Act (WCA), which
is the only statute offering actual enforcement possibilities for
torture violations.125 The MCA changes the WCA to say that only
"grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention's Common Article
111126 as defined under the MCA will constitute criminal offenses
under the act. 127  The MCA lists the acts that constitute grave
breaches, 28 but then goes on to say that "the President has the
authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and
application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher
standards and administrative regulations for violations... which
123 Military Commissions Act § 3(III)(948R)(c)(I-2).
124 Id. § 3(III)(948R)(d)(I-3).
125 18 U.S.C 2441. The amended sections are § 2441 (c) and (d). The WCA is the
statute under which criminal prosecutions for abuses in wartime would be prosecuted.
See id.
126 Geneva Convention Relative to theTreatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
127 Military Commissions Act § 6(b)(l)(B).
128 Id. § 6(b)(l)(B) (torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, performing biological
experiments, murder, mutilation or maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury,
rape, sexual assault or abuse, and taking hostages).
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are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions."'2 9 The MCA
also states that "[n]o foreign or international source of law shall
supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the United
States in interpreting the prohibitions [of the amended WCA].' 3 °
So while it purports to fulfill the treaty obligations of the Geneva
Conventions, the MCA itself defines the "grave breaches" without
reference to international norms and reserves for the President the
absolute right to interpret all other infractions under the Act.
Therefore, anything falling short of a grave breach might not be
implicated.
This is vital because of the redefinition of some of the grave
breaches operated by the MCA. The definitions are found in
Section 6 of the Act: "Torture: The act of a person who commits,
or conspired to commit, an act specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain and suffering.., upon another
person within his custody or physical control for the purposes of
obtaining information or a confession. ,i31 The requirement of
specific intent changes the definition of torture so that an
interrogator could conceivably say they had no specific intent to
torture, but only to obtain information. Similarly, the MCA
redefines cruel or inhuman treatment. The MCA states that this is
the "act of a person who commits or conspires to commit, an act
intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or
suffering .... 32 The term "serious physical pain or suffering" is
defined as "a substantial risk of death; extreme physical pain; a
burn or physical disfigurement of a serious nature; significant loss
or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or
mental faculty."' 33 The DTA, in contrast, defines cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment with reference to the Fifth, Eight, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which would
implicate a broader range of actions.134
Finally, the MCA limits the access of detainees to judicial
129 Id. § 6(a)(3)(A).
130 Id. § 6(a)(2).
131 Id. § 6(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added) (this section will be codified as 18 U.S.C.
2441(d).
132 Id. § 6(b)(1)(B).
133 Military Commissions Act § 6(b)(1)(B).
134 42 U.S.C. 400dd(d) (2005).
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review, so that even if a suspect was tortured while detained, and
the military commission erred in allowing torture-obtained
evidence, there would be only limited judicial review by federal
courts. 35  The MCA allows only review for purposes of the
determination of enemy combatant status. 36  The MCA is also
made retroactive, erasing any pending habeas claims already in
federal courts. 137  The result of this jurisdiction stripping is
obviously to further limit the application of the exclusionary rule
to any evidence obtained by torture that might be used against a
detainee, since federal courts are unlikely to hear such claims
under the MCA.
E. The House of Lords v. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court's invalidation of a statute or
action voids the law. 138  To put it another way, a law declared
unconstitutional is no longer a law. 139  This long-established
principle is known as judicial review. 4 ° As Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison, "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.'1'a  In contrast, decisions of the House of Lords, while
controlling for lower courts, do not carry the same force of law as
in the United States.'42 Parliament is supreme in the United
Kingdom and may choose to uphold or repeal statutes rejected by
135 Military Commissions Act § 7(a). The D.C. Circuit is given exclusive appellate
jurisdiction and all other claims are explicitly forbidden. See id § (3)(950G)(a),
(950J)(a)-(b).
136 Id.
137 Id § (b).
138 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803).
139 Id. at 177-78.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 177.
142 Further, although the U.K. is going to create a Supreme Court functioning
separately from Parliament, the principle of parliamentary supremacy shall remain. See
Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom Consultation Paper
(Department for Constitutional Affairs), July 2003, at 20-21, http://www.dca.gov.uk/
consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf ("In our democracy, Parliament is supreme. There is
no separate body of constitutional law which takes precedence over all other law. The
constitution is made up of the whole body of the laws and settled practice and
convention, all of which can be amended or repealed by Parliament.").
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the Law Lords. 143
IV. Analysis
Some have argued that the House of Lords decision in
December 2005 has had a substantial impact around the world as a
condemnation of torture. 1" Observers have also voiced
reservations about the potential limitations of the holding. 145 One
commentator who analyzed the opinion found the central holding
of discrimination to be far too limited, almost a "technicality,"
instead of a broad condemnation of torture. 146 The aim of this note
is to examine the potential impact of the case by comparing it with
the treatment of evidence obtained by torture in the United States.
The comparison is important because the issue has not yet been
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, and because the British
decision may help to clarify the likely trajectory of this issue in
American courts. Also, the decision helps bring into relief the
contrasting effects of the exclusionary rule in the British and
American systems of justice in the context of the war on terror.
A. The Current Approach to Torture in the United States
The U.S. Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to hear a
case comparable to A and others II on the subject of third-party
torture. 147  The United States government has given some
indications of how the topic of third-party torture is viewed by the
executive branch. In a series of now-infamous memoranda 148 (the
143 Id. at 2 1.
144 See Roger Smith, The Pain Game, LAW GAZETrE, Jan. 5, 2006, available at
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/view=feature.lawFEATUREID=262854 (arguing
that the decision by the House of Lords that evidence obtained by torture is inadmissible
in British courts has reverberated around the world).
145 Paul Mendelle, No Detention Please, We're British?, 156 NEW. L.J. 77 (2005).
146 Id. In other words, rather than condemning the legislation because torture is
wrong under all circumstances, the court condemned differential treatment of foreign and
British subjects under the statute.
147 See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
148 Memoranda, while lacking precedential value, they often address issues that
have not been adjudicated. "OLC [Office of Legal Counsel] is often asked to address
constitutional issues that will never to make it to court-what lawyers call non-
justiciable political questions. In these circumstances, the formal advice of OLC may be
the only sort of 'precedent' that exists." Michael C. Dorf, The Justice Department's
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"Torture Memos"), 149 the George W. Bush Administration set
forth a view on torture that contrasts starkly with past
condemnations enunciated by the Supreme Court.15° Those
memoranda, if used as a blueprint for United States policy, would
lead to executive actions that violate both American jurisprudence
and international standards on torture-obtained evidence. In
January 2002, Deputy Attorney General John Yoo, in order to
allow interrogation techniques that would otherwise violate the
Geneva Conventions, 51 wrote a memo defining captured members
of Al-Qaida and the Taliban as outside the Geneva Conventions. 15 2
Then, in August of the same year, deputy Attorney General (now
9th Circuit Judge) Jay Bybee wrote another memo in which he
attempted to narrow the definition of torture to actions that result
in organ failure or death.'53
What is striking about these "Torture Memos" is their
seemingly sanguine approach to the topic of torture. It is
important to note that these memoranda did not concern something
as remote as the use of evidence obtained by third-party torture.
The memos addressed the use of torturous techniques by
American agents themselves.'54 The Bybee and Yoo memos
Change of Heart Regarding Torture: A Fair-Minded and Praiseworthy Analysis That
Could Have Gone Still Further, Findlaw's Writ, Jan. 5, 2000, http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/dorf/20050105.html.
149 See, e.g., John Yoo, Commentary: Behind the "Torture Memos," UC Berkley
News, Jan. 4, 2005, available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/
0 1/05-johnyoo.shtml.
150 Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., & Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., 1
(Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/
02.01.09.pdf [hereinafter Yoo Memorandum].
151 See generally, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions].
152 Id.
153 Memorandum from Office of the Assistant Att'y Gen. to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President at 6 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www
.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf
[hereinafter Bybee Memorandum]; see also, Julian Coman, Interrogation Abuses Were
'Approved at Highest Levels,' SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), June 13, 2004, at 26 (then-
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales characterized aspects of the Geneva Convention
protections as "quaint" and "obsolete").
154 Yoo Memorandum, supra note 150; Bybee Memorandum, supra note 153.
2006]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
represent an alternative not considered in the British case. The
British Secretary of State argued in A and Others II, as a
justification for allowing evidence that may have been obtained by
third-party torture, that SIAC should be able to hear all relevant
material relied upon by the Secretary of State's office in the
certification of foreigners suspected of terrorism.'55  In the
"Torture Memos" the U.S. is taking a position on torture that is
substantially different from that evinced by the British. Rather
than simply questioning the ability of U.S. agents to acquire third-
party information under norms of international law, the authors
fundamentally redefined international law to exclude tortuous
interrogation methods used by U.S. agents from the realm of
torture. 1
56
The Torture Memos were such an abrogation of the normal
approach to torture that the Justice Department later issued a
superseding memorandum renouncing some of the more
controversial positions taken in the Yoo and Bybee memos. 157 The
new memo retracted the extreme position taken on what
constitutes "severe" pain under the torture statute, 158 and also
recanted the prior statement that the President's commander in
chief power could serve as a defense to liability. 159  The
superseding of the Torture Memos by the White House is a
significant acknowledgement that the administration's policies had
gone too far in defining executive actions outside the reach of
torture sanctions.
The language of these memos also needs to be read in
conjunction with the holdings of the Supreme Court. Recall that
in Sosa the Court seemed to hold that a clear violation of
international law norms might well lead to liability under the Alien
Tort Statute. 6° The question, if it ever came before the Court,
155 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others 11) [2005]
UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1281 (U.K.).
156 Yoo Memorandum, supra note 150; Bybee Memorandum, supra note 153.
157 Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y. Gen., to James B.
Comey, Assistant Att'y. Gen., (Dec. 30, 2004) available at http://www.usdoj
.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf [hereinafter Levin Memo].
158 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000).
159 Levin Memo, supra note 157, at 2.
160 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-34 (2004).
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would then be what constituted a norm of international law. In
Sosa, the Court made reference to the ICCPR and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, but failed to find either applicable
to the petitioner's case. 161 The Court also made the point that
"although the Covenant does bind the United States as a matter of
international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the
express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not
itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts."'
162
Given the reservations frequently articulated by the U.S. as a
condition of signing any international agreement 63 and the
redefinition of torture currently underway in the "war on terror,"
there seems to be every indication that the Supreme Court, if
confronted with the issue, might allow considerably more than
what the "norms" of international law recognize as legal. In
addition, there is the matter of extraterritoriality described above
in relation to U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez. In that case the Court
held that the protections of the U.S. Constitution do not extend to
foreigners outside of the United States."6 Given this opinion, it
seems plausible to imagine the Court allowing evidence obtained
illegally from foreign persons outside the United States.
Even if the Court were to find the actions of American agents
or their proxies to be in violation of the norms of international law,
the U.S. has engaged in a strategy of avoidance when it comes to
the structures of domestic and international law that might keep
any torture claims out of American courts altogether. 165  By
placing detainees in extraterritorial detention, such as Guantdnamo
Bay in Cuba, or prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States
can "retain maximum control over the conduct of interrogations
and torture while simultaneously minimizing the potential for legal
oversight.' 166
The Supreme Court did seem to limit the ability of the White
House to conduct an extra-judicial campaign of interrogation and
161 Id. at 734-45.
162 Id. at 735.
163 See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. no. 101-30, (1990).
164 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269.
165 See, e.g., Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Juridical
Othering, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 504 (2005).
166 id. at 516.
2006]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
intelligence gathering by requiring some due process for detainees
in the war on terror. 167 But the White House has found other ways
of expanding executive authority to interpret the law in its own
fashion. The McCain Amendment, as mentioned above, was
intended to create a stronger message about the prevention of
torture by U.S. agents.168 However, President Bush, in signing the
amendment into law, put forth language in his "Signing
Statement" that sent a different message, indicating the executive
branch intends to continue to define what constitutes torture for
itself:
The Executive Branch shall construe [the Amendment] ... in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as
Commander-in-Chief and consistent with the constitutional
limitations on judiciary power, which will assist in achieving the
shared objective of the Congress and the President... of
protecting the American people from further terrorist attack. 1
69
Presidents have long used signing statements to add some
executive clarification or input into a piece of legislation.170 They
do not carry the force of law, 17' but their legitimate purposes have
been enumerated as:
(1) explaining to the public, and particularly to constituencies
167 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that an American
detained as enemy an combatant was entitled to process); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that Guantdnamo detainees may challenge their detention in
federal court).
168 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2005). See supra text accompanying notes 103-111.
169 President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1917, 1919 (Jan. 2,
2006) [hereinafter Signing Statement].
170 Walter A. Dellinger, Asst. Attorney General, The Legal Significance of
Presidential Signing Statements, Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to
the President (Nov. 3, 1993) ("Examples of signing statements of this kind can be found
as early as the Jackson and Tyler Administrations, and later Presidents, including
Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman,
Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, also engaged in the practice.")
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm.
171 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (striking down use of
military tribunals for Guantdnamo detainees). In Hamdan the Supreme Court considered
the Detainee Treatment Act and failed to take the Signing Statement into account at all.
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interested in the bill, what the President believes to be the likely
effects of its adoption, (2) directing subordinate officers within
the Executive Branch how to interpret or administer the
enactment, and (3) informing Congress and the public that the
Executive believes that a particular provision would be
unconstitutional in certain of its applications, or that it is
unconstitutional on its face, and that the provision will not be
given effect by the Executive Branch to the extent that such
enforcement would create an unconstitutional condition.
72
There is an argument that President Bush has gone further by
employing the signing statement to defy the legislative and
judicial branches, upsetting the balance of power."'
The Bush signing statement does not explicitly indicate the
President's intentions, but given the context of the torture memos,
the redefinition of torture under the MCA, and the practices
employed by the Bush Administration to retain extra-judicial
control over detainees, its purpose seems clear enough. The
statement is intended to give the executive branch wide latitude in
employing interrogation techniques that may violate international
norms. 174 The "unitary executive" has become a buzzword, used
to indicate the augmentation of executive authority that some
accuse the George W. Bush Administration of undertaking.'75
Also, the fact that the administration felt it needed to add a
specific caveat to an anti-torture measure is telling.
The use of the Signing Statement indicates that the White
House intended to interpret the amendment's provisions on habeas
corpus as withdrawing federal jurisdiction over cases involving
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Sign Here, SLATE, Jan. 30, 2006, http://www.
slate.cornid/2134919/. It should be noted that President Bush has made more frequent
use of the signing statement than any other president for the purpose of challenging the
constitutionality of a bill. See id. For a detailed table giving the actual count of signing
statements by President George W. Bush, see Christopher Kelly, Number of New
Statutes Challenged, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/
nation/washington/articles/2006/04/30/statutes challenged/.
174 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 38, § 7 (taking a strong normative stance against
the use of torture); European Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
175 See, e.g., Jennifer Van Bergen, The Unitary Executive: Is The Doctrine Behind
the Bush Presidency Consistent with a Democratic State?, FINDLAW, Jan. 9, 2006,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060109 bergen.html.
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foreign "enemy combatants."' 76  Since at that time there were
several habeas petitions pending in the D.C. Circuit, this language
is intended to strip the petitioners of judicial review for their
treatment, inhumane or otherwise.'77  In spite of laws that
ostensibly forbid the use of torture in the United States, a
relatively complex and sophisticated system has been created to
enable the executive branch to avoid the judicial sanction of
exclusion for evidence obtained by torture, regardless of who
commits the torturous act.
The George W. Bush Administration met a setback in early
2006 when the Supreme Court heard one of the pending habeas
cases of a Guantdnamo Bay prisoner in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.17 8
Hamdan was Osama Bin Laden's driver and was being held
pending a hearing before a military tribunal convened by the
administration to deal with Guantdnamo detainees.17 9  The
Supreme Court struck down the use of the military tribunals in
Hamdan and held that the petitioner had the right to be heard by
federal courts. 18' The Court found no authorizing Congressional
language in the Detainee Treatment Act or any of the other
statutes that the government contended allowed them to use the
military tribunals.' 8' Hamdan could be read as a victory for those
who believe detainees deserve at least a modicum of judicial
process, 82 but it also highlights the administration's opposition to
generally accepted norms of international law in such cases.
Further, whatever the judicial opinion expressed in Hamdan
176 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (2005) (for amended habeas statute).
177 See Almurbati v. Bush, 366 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.D.C. 2005); Ahmed v. Bush, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14024 (D.D.C., July 8, 2005); Mammar v. Bush, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38126 (D.D.C. May 2, 2005) (cases in which Guantdnamo detainees sought
review by federal courts).
178 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
179 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2005).
180 Id. Hamdan was a 5-3 decision, with Justice Stevens writing the majority
opinion. Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito all dissented. Justice Kennedy concurred in part and in the judgment, making
portions of the Stevens opinion a plurality. The Chief Justice recused himself, having sat
on the panel that originally decided the case in the D.C. Circuit.
181 Id. at 2775.
182 The Court did not forbid the use of military tribunals; it merely found no
congressional authorization for them. See id.
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may have been, the passing of the MCA has superseded, for the
time being, the Court's ruling on military commissions. The
MCA, as mentioned above, reduces judicial review of detainee
treatment, and redefines the meaning of "torture" and "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment," in such a way as to assure that
the decisions of military commissions will not receive much
federal judicial scrutiny. 183
B. The Role of the Exclusionary Rule
Traditionally the primary sanction imposed by American
judges for evidence tainted by torture or other illegal methods is
the exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence. 184 In contrast, the
British do not have a broad exclusionary rule. 185  In the British
system, evidence is presumed to be admissible unless it can be
proven that its admission would make the proceedings unfair.'86
In the United States, there is a fairly robust exclusionary rule,
which not only prohibits the admission of illegally obtained
evidence, but also excludes any further evidence obtained as a
result of an initial illegal search or seizure: this is known as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 87  Given this basic
framework, one would expect the British to be more likely to
admit evidence obtained by torture. But as A and Others II
illustrates, the British Law Lords have decided that third-party
torture will trigger the exclusion of evidence.18
8
One reason for this is that the British are more clearly bound
by international law proscribing the use of evidence obtained by
183 See supra notes 119-133 and accompanying text.
184 See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence
gathered during an illegal search is not admissible and applying the exclusionary rule to
the states).
185 See Samiloff, Interrogating Evidence, supra note 10.
186 Id.
187 See, e.g., ALLEN, ET. AL., supra note 87, at 709-19 (2005); see also Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (establishing the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine).
188 Even Lord Hope of Craighead, who supported the less-stringent burden of proof
standard of "balance of the probabilities" was stridently opposed to the use of evidence
obtained by third party torture, writing that "the admission of any statements obtained by
this means against third parties is absolutely precluded in any proceedings as evidence."
A and others H, [2005] 3 W.L.R. 1249, 1300.
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torture. The European Convention is clear on this point,189 and the
British have codified the Convention's anti-torture provisions
under domestic law.190  In contrast, the United States, while
signing the U.N. Convention, did so with reservations that allow
American courts the flexibility to interpret what constitutes torture
under U.S. law.' 9' Even taking these differing approaches to
international treaty obligations into account, it is difficult to escape
the irony that Britain is enforcing the exclusionary rule more
stridently than the United States. By bringing this evidentiary
irony into relief, this note seeks to examine the problems of using
evidence obtained by torture.
One of the primary arguments advanced for the exclusionary
rule is that it deters law enforcement agents from violating the
rules, lest they be deprived of the evidence gathered at trial. 92 In
support of the exclusionary rule, Professor William Stuntz has
argued that the exclusion of evidence provides the perfect
deterrence: "suppression is restitutionary: the officer loses the very
thing he gained from the illegal search, and no more. That largely
takes care of overdeterrence. And because the rule does not
seriously overdeter, courts need not reserve it for the worst
constitutional violations."' 193  Stuntz was writing primarily about
police searches under the Fourth Amendment, but as the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Mississippi194 indicates, evidence
obtained by torture may be even more likely to be subject to
exclusion. This is simply because an allegation of torture is far
189 European Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
190 Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42, art. 1 (U.K.).
191 U.N. Convention, supra note 43, n. 43. (stating that "[o]n 3 June 1994, the
Secretary-General received a communication from the Government of the United States
of America requesting, in compliance with a condition set forth by the Senate of the
United States of America, in giving advice and consent to the ratification of the
Convention, and in contemplation of the deposit of an instrument of ratification of the
Convention by the Government of the United States of America, that a notification
should be made to all present and prospective ratifying Parties to the Convention to the
effect that: '. . . nothing in this Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other
action, by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States as interpreted by the United States."').
192 See ALLEN, ET. AL., supra note 87, at 345.
193 William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARv. J.
L. & PuB. POL'Y 443, 446 (1997).
194 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see also supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
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more serious than the violations normally predicate for exclusion
under Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Another argument for exclusion is that it discourages use of
the previously mentioned "silver platter" technique.' 95  This
doctrine has a ready application to the issue at hand. One of the
sources of concern over the George W. Bush Administration's
torture policies has been the phenomenon of "extraordinary
rendition," in which a suspect is sent overseas by the United States
to be interrogated by foreign agents who are not subject to United
States laws or norms governing cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. 196  Extraordinary rendition is a kind of international
application of the "silver platter" doctrine, a sophisticated attempt
to avoid the potential strictures of the exclusionary rule. Even
where rendition is used only for intelligence gathering, and will
not likely implicate the exclusion of evidence, it is ultimately a
mechanism for the avoidance of judicial review. In another
controversial memo generated by the Department of Justice's
Office of Legal Counsel, the Bush Administration explicitly stated
that this technique is not a violation of the Geneva Convention.' 97
The final argument usually made for the exclusionary rule is
"judicial integrity."' 98 The argument is that a judicial process that
employs illegally obtained evidence simply lacks fundamental
integrity.'99 But opponents of the rule point out that "integrity"
can be read another way.2°° Even if evidence is excluded from
trial, it remains in the consciousness of the judge, attorneys, and
defendant. The only people who do not know about it are the
jurors, who sit as triers of fact while the judge, lawyers, and
195 See ALLEN, ET. AL., supra note 87, at 345. As previously mentioned, under the
"silver platter" doctrine, law enforcement agents bound by a rule hand over evidence to
court systems in which that rule is not applied, or law enforcement agents not bound by
the rule gather evidence illegally and hand it over to prosecutors in systems governed by
an exclusionary principle. Id.
196 Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Juridical Othering,
45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 504 (2005).
197 Memorandum of Alberto Gonzales, White House General Counsel to President
George W. Bush, Re: Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of
War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002).
198 ALLEN, ET. AL., supra note 87, at 345.
199 Id.
200 Id.
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parties pretend they do not know the excluded evidence exists
(with one side all the while hoping to find a way to bring it in).2 '
Another way to view the judicial integrity argument is to look at it
from the perspective of law enforcement. The exclusionary rule
gives police or other agents the incentive to lie about the
procedures they employed. They have greater credibility than
most suspects or detainees, and can avoid losing valuable evidence
simply by pitting their word against that of a suspected criminal. °2
In spite of the ambiguity of the "judicial integrity" arguments,
this-and not deterrence or the "silver platter" argument-is what
the House of Lords explicitly relied upon in A and others II. Lord
Bingham makes an extensive statement about the effect of
evidence tainted by torture on the judicial process, noting the
unreliability of evidence obtained by torture, but also the "belief
that it degraded all those who lent themselves to the practice. 2 3
Lord Hope of Craighead wrote that "the law will not lend its
support to the use of torture for any purpose whatever. It has no
place in the defence of freedom and democracy, whose very
existence depends on the denial of the use of such methods to the
executive., 204  Lord Hoffman stated explicitly that "I have no
doubt that the purpose of this rule is not to discipline the
executive, although this may be an incidental consequence. It is to
uphold the integrity of the administration of justice. 2 5 This view
contrasts sharply with the outlook of the George W. Bush
Administration. The Bybee and Yoo memos 20 6 and the President's
Signing Statement 27 indicate that their primary concern is not
preventing actions that may degrade the judicial process, but
maintaining wide latitude for state action that might otherwise fall
under judicial sanction.
President Bush's policies beg the question: is the exclusionary
rule partly responsible for the United States' questionable
201 Id.
202 Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1312-13 (1994).
203 A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others 11) [20051
UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. 1249, 1259 (U.K.).
204 Id. at 1300 (Lord Hope of Criaghead).
205 Id. at 1294 (Lord Hoffman).
206 See supra text accompanying notes 150-153.
207 See Signing Statement, supra note 169.
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approach to torture? Potential flaws with the exclusionary rule are
that it is infrequently applied and invariably results in the loss of
valuable evidence.0 8 While there is probably not a direct cause-
and-effect relationship, it does seem likely that the American
approach to redefining and avoiding international norms of torture
is motivated at least in part by the potential loss of vital
information to the exclusionary rule. As Professor Christopher
Slobogin has pointed out, the exclusionary rule only comes into
play if incriminating evidence is found.2 09 This means that law
enforcement agents are generally free to do whatever they wish, as
long as they don't need to use the evidence in a courtroom.
This argument highlights what is at stake in the Bush
Administration's torture policy in the war on terror. The battle
against terrorism is difficult and the price for failure is
extraordinarily high. These high stakes seem to have pushed the
United States to avoid possible failure by circumventing the
exclusionary rule. The Administration has not only sought to
avoid the exclusionary rule by having its agents apply illegal
techniques in non-evidence gathering situations, it has also sought
to remove the potentially illegal fruits of its agents interrogations
from judicial review altogether. By denying U.S. courts
jurisdiction over claims by detainees-either through jurisdiction
stripping legislation, extraordinary rendition, or he redefinition of
torture itself-the current administration is removing the
exclusionary rule entirely from the calculus of those conducting
interrogations. No matter what guidelines or limitations are placed
on interrogation techniques, this elimination of judicial review and
exclusionary sanction will lead to greater potential for abuse.
V. Conclusion
The House of Lords' condemnation of torture may not be as
robust a protection as it sounds in the opinion. As previously
mentioned, there is skepticism that accompanied the decision in
some circles.2"' It is important to remember in this regard that-
although it is the highest court in Britain-the House's decisions
208 See Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule,
1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 365-66.
209 Id. at 372.
210 See Mendelle, supra note 145.
20061
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
are not binding upon Parliament, which retains the ultimate say in
the legality or illegality of British laws.21' But the House's
decision in the earlier stages of A and others led directly to the
replacement of Section 4 of the ATSCA with the Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2005, so the Law Lords' decisions clearly can have
a significant impact. 1 2 Still, it is possible that Parliament could
feel no such compulsion to change the law and ban evidence
obtained by third party torture.
Whatever the domestic legal effect of the Law Lords' decision
in the United Kingdom, it serves as an important foil to the
American approach to third-party torture. The British
condemnation of third-party torture highlights subtle, yet
important, differences in the judicial systems of Britain and the
United States, probably the two closest allies in the war on terror.
In Britain, where no broad exclusionary rule applies, the highest
court in the land saw fit to apply the exclusionary rule and limit
the executive's power to use evidence tainted even indirectly by
21torture. 13 In the United States, illegally obtained evidence is
routinely excluded from judicial proceedings.1 4 Yet in the U.S.
the executive branch has waged a successful campaign to avoid
the illegality of its evidence gathering by redefining torture itself,
and has also attempted to prevent the judiciary from reviewing
questionable methods of interrogation altogether.215
The exclusionary rule may be part of the impetus behind this
seemingly counterintuitive situation. The Law Lords in Britain
may have felt more able to condemn torture knowing that
exclusion is the exception rather than the rule. In other words,
knowing that agents retain the advantage of the presumption of
admissibility, the Law Lords may simply have felt that their
decision would not be overly impactful, particularly given the
relatively light "balance of probabilities" standard imposed by
their holding in A and others ii.216 Conversely, the President of
211 See supra text accompanying note 115.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
213 See generally A and others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A and others
1) [2005] UKHL 71, [2005] 3 W.L.R. 1249 (U.K.).
214 See supra text accompanying note 184.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 150 & 153.
216 See A and others, [2005] 3 W.L.R. at 1301-02 (Lord Craighead).
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the United States may have felt a stronger imperative to
circumvent the judicial system in the war on terror because of the
potential loss of vital evidence to exclusion.
But the exclusionary rule is not necessarily to blame. As
Professor Slobogin points out, the exclusionary rule only comes
into play where evidence has been gathered for use at trial.21 7 In
spite of the challenges from Guantdnamo prisoners and others
detained in the "war on terror," there is not likely to be frequent
use of evidence obtained from terror suspects at trial. Such
evidence is more useful operationally than judicially.
In fact, there is much more at play in this scenario than the
exclusion of evidence. Anytime illegal methods are used, there
may be a question of exclusion. But where the illegality at issue is
torture, and the methods are employed in preventing terrorism,
exclusion actually seems a relatively minor concern. Torture is a
hideous and undignified act for anyone to commit, let alone the
government of a free, democratic society. But the exigencies of
the war on terror may push the boundaries of law enforcement to
the very edge of the known legal universe. The strength of the
Law Lords' decision was in recognizing both these competing
requirements of justice. Their words may not carry binding legal
force, and their decision may have limited application, but the
message is clear: even in the high-stakes world of terrorism
prevention, torture defiles whatever it touches, however indirectly.
Because of the repeated attempts to avoid possible sanction for
torture, the United States--or at least the executive branch-is on
a collision course with this simple but powerful message.
JOHN DUBERSTEIN
217 See Slobogin, supra note 209, at 372.
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